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NOTES
may have been influenced by the particular taxpayer involved in the
suit. South Central Bell, as well as the other large corporations, will
have the resources to challenge the taxes and will not be deterred
from doing so as a result of this decision. For this reason, the court
may have weighed more heavily those policy factors in favor of
awarding attorney's fees to the Collector. However, the potential im-
pact of this decision is yet to be seen; in those cases involving sub-
stantial sums paid under protest, the award of attorney's fees alone
could be staggering.0 In such situations, the amount awarded in at-
torney's fees may seem unwarranted, and the supreme court may be
forced to question whether the practice of imposing attorney's fees
on the losing litigant in protest suits provides the "adequate
remedy" required by the Louisiana constitution.
Allen P. Jones
RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY: NEW GUIDELINES FOR STATE
CRIMINAL TRIAL JURIES
In the past ten years, a series of United States Supreme Court
decisions has reshaped the state criminal trial jury by abandoning
the traditional common law formula requiring twelve-member juries
and unanimous verdicts. In place of that formula, the Court has im-
posed new guidelines based upon a functional model of the jury, a
theoretical construct embodying jury size and unanimity re-
quirements consistent with the function of the jury in contemporary
society. In its two most recent decisions concerning jury size and
unanimity requirements, Ballew v. Georgia' and Burch v. Louisiana,2
the Court has further defined the perimeters within which states
may organize their criminal trial juries. In Ballew, the Court held
that in a state criminal trial involving a noncapital offense, the sixth
and fourteenth amendments' require that the jury consist of no
40. Currently, several pipeline companies plan to challenge the First Use Tax, LA.
R.S. 47:1301-07 (Supp. 1978), by paying under protest, unless the tax is declared uncon-
stitutional before the first payment is due. It is estimated that the potential liability of
these companies under this tax is over 100 million dollars annually. If the companies
lose the protest suit, the award of attorney's fees will be ten percent of that amount.
1. 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
2. 99 S. Ct. 1623 (1979).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
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fewer than six members. More recently, in Burch, the Court held
that conviction by a nonunanimous six-member jury in a state
criminal trial for a nonpetty offense violates the right of the accused
to trial by jury. These cases indicate that the abandonment of the
traditional common law model of the jury has introduced into this
area of the law a struggle, prevalent in other areas of due process
litigation, between the desire for certainty, based upon objective
criteria, and the impulse toward subjective analysis, based upon
"judicial hunch."
Although institutions analogous to the jury may be traced to an-
cient Greece, the jury form with which we are most familiar
developed in England following the Norman Conquest.' Commen-
tators have traditionally viewed the great purposes which gave rise
to the common law jury as being political in nature. In Democracy in
America, de Tocqueville concluded that "[t]he jury is preeminently a
political institution; it must be regarded as one form of the
sovereignty of the people . . . ."' Blackstone observed that trial by
jury "preserves in the hands of the people that share which they
ought to have in the administration of public justice, and prevents
the encroachments of the more powerful and wealthy citizens."6
Thus, the evolution of the jury evidenced the desire to safeguard in-
dividual liberties against intrusion by the government and other
powerful forces.
While admirers of the jury point to the political advantages of
mass participation in the judicial process, others argue that these
advantages are realized at the cost of efficient decision-making 7
Criticism is generally aimed at the inadequate performance of juries
as fact-finders and at the economic inefficiency of utilizing juries as
a means of judicial determination It is maintained that a judge or
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor; and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
In Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), the Court held that the right to trial by
jury in criminal cases is a fundamental right applicable to the states by virtue of the
fourteenth amendment. See text at notes 16-18, infra.
4. M. BLOOMSTEIN, VERDICT: THE JURY SYSTEM 2-20 (1968).
5. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 288 (H. Reeve trans. 1899).
6. W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW 690 (Gavit ed. 1941).
7. See Steuer, The Case Against the Jury, 47 N.Y. ST. B.J. 101, 103 (1975).
8. See, e.g., J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL (1949) (generally critical of the perform-
ance of juries as fact-finders); M. GLEISSER, JURIES AND JUSTICE (1968) (uses case
histories to indicate the shortcomings of jury decisionmaking); G. TULLOCK. THE LOGIC
OF THE LAw 76-104 (1971) (criticism from the viewpoint of economic theory).
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panel of judges, "as a result of training, discipline, recurrent ex-
perience, and superior intelligence," would be better able to analyze
the facts and understand the law "than laymen, selected from a wide
range of intelligence levels, who have no particular experience with
matters of this sort, and who have no durable official
responsibility."9 Additionally, critics assert that the jury system is
too expensive and that a jury often will not follow the law, either
because the jury does not like the law or does not understand it, the
result being an unequal administration of justice."
In light of these and similar criticisms, the question arose as to
whether states may substitute, in criminal actions, a trial before a
judge or panel of judges in place of a trial by jury. Louisiana,
because of its unique civil law background, provided the United
States Supreme Court with a chance to address this threshold ques-
tion. Colonial Louisiana derived its judicial system from France and
Spain," neither of which had developed the jury as a mode of
judicial determination. As a result, prior to becoming a possession of
the United States in 1803, Louisiana did not try criminal defendants
by lay jury. Livingston, the redactor of a proposed penal code for
the state, advocated that trial by jury should "be the mode of trial
in all criminal prosecutions"'"; contrary to his suggestion, constitu-
tional and statutory law in Louisiana did not provide for jury trials
in misdemeanor 4 cases until 1968." In that year the Supreme Court
9. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 8 (1966).
10. Id.
11. See 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A. HISTORY OF ENGLIGH LAW 314-17 (5th ed. 1931); In-
bau, The Concept of Fair Hearing in Anglo-American Law, 31 TUL. L. REV. 67 (1956).
Professor Inbau has theorized that the absence of jury trials in continental Europe
may be attributable to the lack of strong centralized governments. As a result, civil
and canon lawyers influenced the method of dispensing justice in a direction other
than trial by jury.
12. For a detailed discussion of the judicial process in colonial Louisiana, see Dart,
The Place of the Civil Law in Louisiana, 4 TUL. L. REV. 163, 174 (1930).
13. E. LIVINGSTON. REPORT ON A PENAL CODE OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA 121 (1822),
in 1 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF EDWARD LIVINGSTON ON CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE 15-16
(1968) (emphasis added).
14. LA. R.S. 14:2 (1950) provides: "'Felony' is any crime for which an offender may
be sentenced to death or imprisonment at hard labor .... 'Misdemeanor' is any crime
other than a felony."
15. 1968 La. Acts, No. 635, amending LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 779. Prior to 1968,
"[a] defendant charged with a misdemeanor . . . [was] tried by the court without a
jury." LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 779 (as it appeared prior to 1968 La. Acts, No. 635). Con-
stitutions prior to 1974 similarly contained no provisions for jury trials in misdemeanor
cases. LA. CONST. of 1921, art. I, § 9 & art. VII, § 41; LA. CONST. of 1913, arts. 9, 116 &
140; LA. CONST. of 1898, arts. 9 & 116; LA. CONST. of 1879, art. 7; LA. CONST. of 1868, tit.
I, art. 6 & tit. IV, art. 87; LA. CONST. of 1864, tit. VII, art. 105 & tit. V, art. 82; LA. CONST.
of 1852, tit. VI, arts. 103, 124 & tit. IV, art. 78; LA. CONST. of 1845, tit. VI, arts. 107 &
128; LA. CONST. of 1812, art. VI, §18.
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held in Duncan v. Louisiana"6 that "trial by jury in criminal cases is
fundamental to the American scheme of justice," and, as a result,
the fourteenth amendment guarantees a "right of jury trial in all
criminal cases which-were they to be tried in a federal
court-would come within the Sixth Amendment's guarantee."'1 By
making the sixth amendment applicable to the states via the four-
teenth amendment, the Court compelled Louisiana to provide jury
trials in all criminal cases involving a fine in excess of five hundred
dollars or imprisonment for more than six months.18
Though the Duncan Court clearly required states to provide
jury trials in all nonpetty cases, it did not specify whether states
would also be forced to satisfy the common law standard of twelve-
member juries. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Duncan, raised this
question and significantly foreshadowed the Court's ultimate deci-
sion on the subject when he noted that "the rule, imposed long ago
in the federal courts, that 'jury' means 'jury of exactly twelve,' is
not fundamental to anything: there is no significance except to
mystics in the number 12."' 1
Agreeing with Justice Harlan's conclusion, the Court held, in the
1970 case of Williams v. Florida,"0 that a criminal trial before a six-
member jury does not violate the defendant's sixth or fourteenth
amendment rights. Finding that the twelve-member requirement
was "a historical accident," the Court concluded that the framers did
not explicitly intend to codify, as a constitutional requirement, that
feature of the common law jury. The result reached by the Court
was based upon its determination that a twelve-member jury is not
essential to the sixth amendment's purpose of interposing between
the defendant and the prosecution the common sense judgment of
defendant's peers."
16. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
17. ld. at 149.
18. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 779, as amended by 1968 La. Acts, No. 635.
19. 391 U.S. at 182 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan objected to what he
perceived as a total incorporation of the sixth amendment into the fourteenth. Among
other things, he feared that a total incorporation would impose an unduly strict uniform-
ity upon the various states and might lead to an eventual lessening of the federal stan-
dards under the sixth amendment. See also Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 138 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring).
20. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
21. Id. at 92-99. Several commentators believed that the number of jurors at com-
mon law came to be fixed at twelve for mystical or superstitious reasons. Note G. Dun-
combe's explanation:
[Tihis number is no less esteemed by our own law than by holy writ. If the
twelve apostles on their twelve thrones must try us in our eternal state, good
reason hath the law to appoint the number twelve to try us in our temporal. The
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Though, in Williams, the Court allowed state deviation from the
common law jury size requirement, it did not address the issue of
whether the sixth and fourteenth amendments embodied the com-
mon law requirement of unanimous verdicts." Criticism of the
unanimity requirement centered primarily upon the number of hung
juries and the resulting necessity for retrials. As Professor
Slovenko of Tulane University noted: "Expediency and analogy are
against the common law practice of requiring unanimous verdicts. It
is difficult for twelve men to agree on any question, particularly if
they come from diversified elements of the population." 3 In its 1972
Johnson v. Louisiana2 decision, the Court decided that a
nonunanimous jury verdict (a nine of twelve vote majority) does not
offend the defendant's right to due process or equal protection. The
case, however, did not rest on sixth amendment grounds since the
Johnson trial was held prior to Duncan and the Court had already
decided that the Duncan incorporation of the sixth into the four-
teenth amendment would not be given retroactive application. 5 In
Apodaca v. Oregon, 21 the Court held that a nonunanimous verdict (a
ten of twelve vote majority), in a case involving a noncapital offense,
does not violate the sixth and fourteenth amendments. As in
Williams, the Apodaca Court refused to be swayed solely by the
traditional jury requirements in its determination; the Court found
that the fourteenth amendment does not incorporate the sixth
amendment requisite of unanimity. The Court focused upon the func-
tion served by the jury in contemporary society27 and the ability of
nonunanimous juries to perform this function. Upon completion of
this inquiry, the Court could "perceive no difference between juries
required to act unanimously and those permitted to convict or ac-
quit by votes of 10 to two or 11 to one. '28
tribes of Israel were twelve, the partriarchs were twelve, and Solomon's officers
were twelve.
1 G. DUNCOMBE, TRIALS PER PAIS 92-93 (8th ed. 1766), quoted in J. PROFFATT, TRIAL BY
JURY 112 n.4 (1877). Lord Coke observed that the "number of twelve is much respected
in holy writ, as 12 apostles, 12 stones, 12 tribes, etc." E. COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND 155a (1st Am. ed. 1812).
22. "We intimate no view whether or not the requirement of unanimity is an in-
dispensable element of the Sixth Amendment jury trial." 399 U.S. at 100 n.46.
23. Slovenko, Control Over the Jury Verdict in Louisiana Criminal Law, 20 LA.
L. REV. 657, 681 (1960).
24. 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
25. See DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968).
26. 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
27. Id. at 410.
28. Id. at 411. The Court's language may indicate that the nine to three verdict
which was upheld in Johnson would not meet constitutional requirements now that the
sixth amendment has been incorporated into the fourteenth.
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In the Williams-Johnson-Apodaca trilogy of cases, the Supreme
Court permitted individual states to modify, through the manipula-
tion of size and unanimity requirements, the traditional form of the
jury. However, in its most recent decisions in this area, the Court
has rejected further modifications of state criminal trial juries. In
Ballew v. Georgia,9 the defendant challenged his conviction by a
five-member state trial jury. Although the Court in Williams had
determined that a six-member jury, in a case involving a noncapital
offense, was of sufficient size to meet sixth amendment re-
quirements, it reserved the question of whether smaller juries might
also meet this standard."0 Faced with this exact issue in Ballew, the
Court expressed doubt as to the validity of a five-member jury
under the standards enunciated in Williams." Justice Blackmun,
writing for the Court, placed great emphasis upon recent empirical
studies of juries.2 While conceding that these studies could not iden-
tify the precise number of jurors needed to form a properly func-
tioning jury, he noted that they do "raise significant questions about
the wisdom and constitutionality of a reduction below six."33 The
Court found that progressively smaller juries are less likely to
foster effective group deliberation" and that the studies raise
doubts about the consistency and accuracy of the results achieved
by smaller panels.35 The opinion further indicated concern that such
a reduction in the size of the jury increases the likelihood that juries
will contain no minority representatives. Based upon the above
possibilities, the Court concluded that a state criminal trial jury of
fewer than six members would threaten sixth and fourteenth
amendment interests. 7
The unanimity question resurfaced in Burch v. Louisiana,3"
wherein the Court was called upon to decide the constitutionality of
Louisiana's statutory and constitutional provisions permitting
nonunanimous verdicts (a five of six vote majority) in state criminal
29. 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
30. In a footnote to its Williams opinion, the Court stated: "We have no occasion
in this case to determine what minimum number can still constitute a 'jury,' but we do
not doubt that six is above that minimum." 399 U.S. at 91 n.28.
31. 435 U.S. at 232.
32. M. SAKS, JURY VERDICTS (1977); Friedman, Trial by Jury: Criteria for Convic-
tions, Jury Size and Type I and Type II Errors, AM. STATISTICIAN April 1972, at 21;
Nagel & Neef, Deductive Modeling to Determine an Optimum Jury Size and Fraction
Required to Convict, 1975 WASH. U. L.Q. 933.
33. 435 U.S. at 232.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 234.
36. Id. at 237.
37. Id. at 243-44.
38. 99 S. Ct. 1623 (19791
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trials for nonpetty offenses. 9 Louisiana had relied upon the Court's
prior decisions permitting six-member juries in noncapital cases"0
and, allowing nonunanimous verdicts in cases involving twelve-
member juries.41
As one writer pointed out: "If 75 percent concurrence (9/12) was
enough for a verdict as determined in Johnson v. Louisiana then re-
quiring 83 percent concurrence (5/6) ought to be within the permissi-
ble limits of Johnson."'" In Burch, the Court did not concern itself
with the percentage of concurring votes, but rather with the threat
to those constitutional principles that led to the establishment of a
size threshold of six members."' After noting that only two of the
twenty-five states utilizing six-member juries also allowed less-than-
unanimous verdicts," the Court held that when a state has chosen to
reduce the size of its juries to the minimum constitutional number of
jurors, nonunanimous jury verdicts are prohibited. In so holding, the
Court was influenced by the "threat to preservation of the
substance of the jury trial guarantee" that was perceived by the
Ballew Court.45
In this series of post-Duncan decisions, the Supreme Court has
set forth general guidelines within which states may organize their
39. LA. CONST. art I, § 17, provides:
A criminal case in which the punishment may be capital shall be tried before a
jury of twelve persons, all of whom must concur to render a verdict. A case in
which the punishment is necessarily confinement at hard labor shall be tried
before a jury of twelve persons, ten of whom must concur to render a verdict. A
case in which the punishment may be confinement at hard labor or confinement
without hard labor for more than six months shall be tried before a jury of six
persons, five of whom must concur to render a verdict. The accused shall have a
right to full voir dire examination of prospective jurors and to challenge jurors
peremptorily. The number of challenges shall be fixed by law. Except in capital
cases, a defendant may knowingly and intelligently waive his right to a trial by
jury.
LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 779 (as it appeared prior to 1979 La. Acts. No. 56) stated:
A defendant charged with a misdemeanor in which the punishment may be a
fine in excess of five hundred dollars or imprisonment for more than six months
shall be tried by a jury of six jurors, five of whom must concur to render a ver-
dict.
The defendant charged with any other misdemeanor shall be tried by the
court without a jury.
40. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
41. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356
(1972).
42. Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35
LA. L. REV. 1. 56 n.300 (1974) (citation omitted).
43. 99 S. Ct. at 1628. See text at note 37, supra.
44. 99 S. Ct. at 1628 n.12.
45. Id. at 1628.
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criminal juries. A state may reduce the size of its juries, in non-
capital cases, to six members," but juries composed of fewer than
six members are prohibited by the sixth and fourteenth amend-
ments.47 Nonunanimous verdicts are permitted in cases involving
twelve-member juries." If, however, the state has chosen to reduce
the size of its juries to six members, the Constitution prohibits less-
than-unanimous verdicts." These decisions leave at least one ques-
tion unanswered in the area of jury size and unanimity re-
quirements: the constitutionality of nonunanimous verdicts :rendered
by juries composed of more than six yet fewer than twelve
members."0 The Louisiana legislature, in response to the Burch deci-
sion, amended article 779 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to pro-
vide for unanimous verdicts in misdemeanor cases involving six-
member juries. 1 If the imposition of a unanimity requirement leads
to a significant increase in the number of mistrials due to hung
juries, proposals might be made to increase the size of juries in
misdemeanor cases in order to reinstate a nonunanimous verdict
scheme. In its 1950 Projet of a Constitution for the State of Loui-
siana, the Louisiana State Law Institute proposed that quasi-felonies
be tried by eight-member juries, with six members concurring in
46. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
47. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
48. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356
(1972).
49. Burch v. Louisiana, 99 S. Ct. 1623 (1979).
50. Id. at 1628 n.11.
51. 1979 La. Acts, No. 56. It should be noted that article I, section 17 of the Loui-
siana constitution, see note 39, supra, has not been amended and still requires a con-
currence of only five of the six jurors to reach a verdict. Subsequent to the Burch deci-
sion, the Louisiana Supreme Court, in State v. Jackson, 370 So. 2d 570 (La. 1979),
granted the state's request for a special jury instruction to the effect that all six of the
jurors must concur in a verdict. In State v. Claiborne, 370 So. 2d 1257 (La. 1979), the
state applied for supervisory writs upon learning that the trial judge intended to in-
struct the trial jury that, in accordance with the Burch decision, there must be a
unanimous verdict to convict but that only five of the six jurors need concur in order
to acquit the defendant. The Louisiana Supreme Court accepted the state's argument
that, since neither the Burch decision nor the state constitution distinguishes between
verdicts to convict and verdicts to acquit, the imposition of a unanimity requirement
on one should also be applied to the other. In all deference to the court, it should be
noted that the Burch decision addressed only the qusestion of whether the sixth and
fourteenth amendment rights of an accused are violated when he is convicted by a
less-than-unanimous six-member jury. It is difficult to interpret the Burch decision as
saying that the constitutional rights of an accused are violated when he is acquitted by
a less-than-unanimous jury. It is submitted that the constitutional guarantee of an ac-
quittal upon the concurrence of five of six jurors, as found in article I, section 17 of the
Louisiana constitution, was not invalidated by the Butch decision and should still be
given effect. Any change in legislative intent should be reflected through an amend-
ment to the constitutional provision in question.
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any verdict rendered.52 The suggestion was opposed by the smaller
parishes, which were apprehensive of the additional costs and in-
convenience of securing eight-member juries for these lesser
crimes." Faced with the possibility of a larger number of mistrials,
these smaller parishes might find a scheme utilizing eight-member
juries and nonuanimous verdicts to be less costly than the current
six-member, unanimous verdict jury scheme.
If Louisiana, or any other state, should choose to authorize less-
than-unanimous verdicts by juries composed of more than six, yet
fewer than twelve members, the Court may once again be called
upon to define the perimeters within which states may organize
their criminal trial juries. The cases indicate that the constitutional-
ity of a new jury size or unanimity requirement will depend upon
the ability of a jury, conforming to the proposed modification, to
perform its constitutional function of safeguarding the accused from
governmental and judicial abuse."
The latest decisions indicate a lack of consensus among Court
members as to what criteria should be used in determining the ability
of a jury to perform its functions. Justice Blackmun's opinion in
Ballew suggests that decisions regarding jury size and unanimity re-
quirements may, in large part, be based upon empirical jury
studies.55 Justice Powell, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice
Rehnquist, concurred in the Ballew judgment but criticized Justice
Blackmun's "reliance on numerology derived from statistical
studies."5 In answering the criticism, Justice Blackmun, in a foot-
note to his opinion, stated:
We have considered them [empirical jury studies] carefully
because they provide the only basis,.besides judicial hunch, for a
52. LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE. PROJET OF A CONSTITUTION FOR THE STATE OF
LOUISIANA art. VI, § 32 (1950).
53. See Bennett, Louisiana Criminal Procedure-A Critical Appraisal, 14 LA. L.
REV. 11, 26 (1953).
54. In Williams, the Court noted that the primary function of the jury "is to pre-
vent oppression by the Government." 399 U.S. at 100. Similarly, the Court in Duncan
observed that "[plroviding an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers
gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and
against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge." 391 U.S. at 156.
55. See note 32, supra, and accompanying text.
56. 435 U.S. at 246 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell noted:
Also, I have reservations as to the wisdom-as well as the necessity-of MR.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S heavy reliance on numerology derived from statistical
studies. Moreover, neither the validity nor the methodology employed by the
studies cited was subjected to the traditional testing mechanisms of the adver-
sary process. The studies relied on merely represent unexamined findings of per-
sons interested in the jury system.
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decision about whether smaller and smaller juries will be able to
fulfill the purpose and functions of the Sixth Amendment.
Without an examination about how juries and small groups ac-
tually work, we would not understand the basis for the conclu-
sion of MR. JUSTICE POWELL that "a line has to be drawn
somewhere." We also note that THE CHIEF JUSTICE did not
shrink from the use of empirical data in Williams v. Florida,
when the data were used to support the constitutionality of the
six-person criminal jury, or in Colgrove v. Battin, a decision also
joined by MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST. 57
In contrast to the Ballew decision, Justice Rehnquist's opinion in
Burch made no reference to empirical data, nor did it indicate why
the Burch jury was incapable of performing its constitutional func-
tion. Instead, the Court seemed to rely upon what Justice Blackmun
termed "judicial hunch"58 in its decisionmaking. The Court reinforced
its conclusion by noting that of those states with six-member juries
all but two require unanimity. 9 The difference in approach evidenced
by the Burch and Ballew decisions illustrates the tension that exists
between the desire for certainty on the one hand and the impulse
toward subjective analysis on the other. By abandoning traditional
common law jury requirements, the Court has raised a fundamental
question in regard to drawing new guidelines for state criminal trial
juries. Should modern guidelines be based, at least in part, upon em-
pirical data or should the Court be guided by its visceral reaction to
proposed revisions of the trial jury system? Although the accuracy
of some empirical studies may be questioned,"0 decisions based largely
upon empirical data may provide more certainty and predictability
than guidelines based upon "judicial hunch." Just as the Williams
Court determined that the common law jury size guidelines was "a
historical accident,"" so might a future Court determine that con-
temporary jury guidelines based upon "judicial hunch" are nothing
more than arbitrarily drawn lines and are thus subject to modifica-
tion.
Richard L. Lagarde
57. 435 U.S. at 232 n.10 (citations omitted).
58. See text at note 57, supra.
59. The Court declared:
We are buttressed in this view by the current jury practices of the several
States. It appears that of those States that utilize six-member juries in trials of
nonpetty offenses, only two, including Louisiana, also allow nonunanimous ver-
dicts. We think that this near-uniform judgment of the Nation provides a useful
guide in delimiting the line between those jury practices that are constitutionally
permissible and those that are not.
99 S. Ct. at 1628 (footnote omitted).
60. See note 56, supra.
61. 399 U.S. at 89.
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